Kant’s Regulative Principles Expressed in Human Gender and Sexuality
By Anna Nowland
1. Introduction
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has been one of the fundamental texts of modern philosophy. Through positing certain a priori structures of the mind and the transcendentally ideal, consequently also empirically real, he lays a foundation for objective reality. Beyond just principles constituting the possibility of empirical knowledge, there are also regulative principles. These are to be understood as “goals and directions of inquiry” (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 18). Three of these regulative principles are “manifoldness,” “unity,” and “affinity” (A663/B691, p. 601). Beyond just discussing them as theoretical, we can see the uses of these three principles on significant display in our investigations turned inward. As part of our search for knowledge of ourselves as human, this is expressed through concepts of gender and sexuality. This contradicts Kant’s ideas that homosexuality is unnatural in the Metaphysics of Morals, instead showing these things to be quite natural based on his own philosophy (Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 277, p. 96). By examining these three regulative principles individually through the lens of gender and sexuality, this paper will show how we come to understand ourselves and others in our society differently depending on which principle is used. Beyond just being different methods of gaining knowledge, solely focusing on either “manifoldness,” “unity,” or “affinity” can have both positive and negative impacts on society, and this paper will assert that the best approach for an equitable society in these human areas is to continue to seek “affinity.”
2. Kant’s Regulative Principles
To understand the application of these principles in our empirical reality, we first must understand precisely what Kant’s regulative principles are. Principles like the categories constitute our access to phenomena, but regulative principles build upon this foundation by guiding our investigations into knowledge of an object. Gary Banham differentiated these two types of principles, regulative from constitutive, by saying that regulative principles are “distinguished in producing a rule by means of which a unity of experience can be given” (Banham, 2013, p. 17). We do not blindly grope for knowledge via the categories; this would be to have the mind’s form without any aim. Part of our a priori structure of the mind guides us in our use of reason. It allows us to even inquire beyond what we can gain from empirical experience alone, beyond perception, in speculation (Critique of Pure Reason, A654/B682, p. 596). Consequently, Kant believes we are led to regulative ideas in what he refers to as “unavoidable problems of pure reason,” including metaphysical topics like God, freedom, and immortality (A3/B7, p. 139). This is not to say that regulative principles are limited to concepts beyond sensory experience; it is merely the way the structure of our mind aims towards goals, whether guiding the mind in the realm of empirical experience or, in some cases, beyond.
In the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic,” Kant denotes three of these principles as ways that “reason thus prepares the field for the understanding” (A658/B686, p. 598). Since there is a manifold of sense data given to the intuition that the understanding synthesizes into a unified experience, there must be a priori principles of the mind that guide the aim of that synthesis. Otherwise, it would be like a train with no destination; it’s meaningless. As Nabeel Hamid wrote, “Reason’s conditions are presupposed in the understanding’s determination of sensibly given materials; they are not introduced subsequent to experience” (Hamid, 2022, p. 646). As a priori, these conditions make experience as we know it possible by structurally supplying us with reason’s goals.
Kant describes these as the law of homogeneity, specification, and continuity (Critique of Pure Reason, A662/B690, p. 601). He describes the law of homogeneity as the aim of the understanding in which we seek a sameness in kind, a unity. He believes we know of this law as it is shown by our ability to understand empirical concepts. The law of specification is the “principle of variety of what is same in kind under lower species”; it is the aim of the understanding regarding manifoldness (A658/B686, p. 598). Despite unifying experience into broader concepts, we refine these into smaller subsections, allowing further differentiation. These two principles conflict with each other, however. In our reason’s aim at unity, we seek a sort of universality; in our reason’s aim at manifoldness, we seek determinacy (A654/B682, p. 596). These two goals are opposite ways of gaining knowledge of an object. Kant believes that the third principle arises from these two, relating them. The law of affinity of all concepts is based on a “graduated increase of varieties” that links every species to one another (A658/B686, p. 598). This move puts all existence on a sort of indeterminate spectrum. Regardless of any unification or differentiation, none exist entirely by themselves, always connected to everything else through graduated, slight differences.
3. Manifoldness in Gender Identity and Sexuality
In terms of gender identity and sexuality, the regulative principle of manifoldness has become something more and more developed as people have embraced it over the years. Diversity is something to be celebrated in our society, and there are clear, tangible benefits to having this diversity. It enhances creativity and encourages novel ideas, better decision-making, and better problem-solving (Phillips, 2014). This is because “people work harder in diverse environments both cognitively and socially” due to the expectation that differences of opinion and perspective make consensus in a group more difficult (Phillips, 2014). Subcommunities emerge as more specific commonalities between people are found, and labels can be assigned to these subgroups of individuals with shared traits. With each new group established, more differentiation can be had, historically resulting in multiplicities of new, more specific categorizations to describe gender and sexuality.
Dating back as far as 1862, the German writer Karl Heinrich Ulrich derived new terminology regarding sexuality from characters of Plato’s Symposium, Urning and Urninden, homosexual men and women, respectively (Beachy, 2010). As soon after as 1869, Karoly Maria Kertbeny, a Hungarian writer, coined the terms homosexuality and heterosexuality (Djajic-Horváth, 2022). These concepts had many rebirths and reinterpretations until 1910, when Magnus Hirshfield, a German physician, introduced the term transvestite to conceptualize cross-dressing (Djajic-Horváth, 2023). This was a new type of term as it was no longer simply a discussion of sexuality, and it laid a foundation for conceptualizing gender identities regardless of sexuality. Traced back to the 1960s, the label transgender was used in both medicine and activism, becoming more prominent during the 1990s (Blakemore, 2022). By the 1990s, the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities were so bonded together that the LGB acronym was first used (Blakemore, 2021). In the 2000s, transgender people were included to make this acronym LGBT (Blakemore, 2021). This was followed by the additions of Q for questioning (and later meaning queer), I for intersex, A for asexual, and a “+” to encompass previously unlisted gender identities and sexualities (Blakemore, 2021). This acronym has even further evolutions, exemplifying a drive toward differentiation. As we find new aspects of humanity in gender and sexuality, our desire to label each of these subgroups and subdivide them more is based on the regulative principle of manifoldness; our reason drives us to specify.
While this diversity and aim at manifoldness enriches society and provides acknowledgment and visibility to the people of these subgroups, the problem arises when manifoldness or diversity is the sole aim. It is a good thing to seek out, acknowledge, and celebrate; it brings unique perspectives, helping us understand nuances of humanity we otherwise wouldn’t individually have access to. However, this can be taken to an alienating extent. Diversity is “the condition of having or being composed of differing elements,” which makes it a synonym for manifoldness (Diversity Definition & Meaning). There is a distinct difference between this and inclusion. When focusing on differences in diversity alone, we can lose sight of our similarities. Establishing differentiation without seeking to explicitly bridge the gaps can lead to more social division, hindering social progress toward inclusivity. If the sole acknowledgment is in terms of these differences, there becomes no place for people to relate to one another meaningfully. It would be like constantly trying to explain and investigate why you are different from someone else and finding an indeterminate number of differences as a means to bring the two of you together, a fruitless task.
There must also be an allowance for reuniting similarities that strict manifoldness would not provide. It is unnecessary to change prejudice or behavior if diversity without inclusion is the aim. Biases and stereotypes are certainly not resolved by focusing on differences alone. As Turner Wittstruck expressed, “Categorizing our identities and preferences can halt experimentation and learning more about ourselves. These labels create divides that prevent individuals from finding commonalities with other queer people. This only pushes us back into boxes that queer liberation was intended to break free from” (Wittstruck, 2023). If manifoldness is the sole aim, it becomes limiting as one must still firmly differentiate oneself in specific ways yet be unified under some subgroup with limits on this categorization. Despite the specificity in the regulative principle of manifoldness, we still seek commonality to specify subgroups of people. This leads to stereotyping and potentially inequitable representation of people who do not “fit in” with these generalizations, regardless of the self-affirmation the commonalities may also provide.
4. Unity in Gender Identity and Sexuality
The regulative principle of unity through the lens of gender identity and sexuality is expressed in multiple ways. In seeking homogeneity in sexuality, many forgo labeling themselves at all, and the term pansexual has increased in popularity significantly. The prefix of the label, pan-, means “all, every, whole, all-inclusive,” and it comes from the Greek pan-, meaning “all” (Pan-). Hence, if someone identifies as pansexual, their attraction exists regardless of sex or gender identity (Eldridge, 2023). It is more fluid and a movement in the opposite direction from the differentiation described in manifoldness. In a sense, it is an approach that puts people first before their gender identity, so, in this way, it is a type of universality in sexuality highly represented in younger generations.
GLSEN, the Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network, annually conducts a school climate survey, and they found a 16.9% increase in middle and high school students identifying as pansexual from 2015 to 2017 (Steinmetz, 2020). Not only this, but those students who responded that they identified as pansexual back in 2017 made up 20.5% of the survey subjects (Steinmetz). Especially with the manifoldness found in gender identity, if one does not identify as strictly heterosexual, pansexuality helps do away with some of the limitations that more specific labels regarding non-heterosexual attraction would otherwise impose. It represents a unity of experience aimed at a non-discriminating attraction towards others.
Unity in gender identity is expressed through the label of non-binary. Contrary to many other gender identity labels, it takes a step above previous conceptions in a way that universalizes the label. When referring to someone who identifies as non-binary, because of the fluidity of their gender, the pronouns “they/them” are often used. These are neutral pronouns. Because of this, they are more general and unified than the specificity of gendered pronouns. According to the Household Pulse Survey, young adults born in the 2000s identifying as non-binary increased 60% between 2021 and 2022, and 5% of 18- to 22-year-olds identified as non-binary towards the end of 2022 (Twenge, 2023). Because of the gender binary’s social construct that reinforces different roles and stereotypes of male and female, there seemed to be an inherent need for a concept or label in which people were freed from these expectations and able to exist in a way that disregards the manifold of gender identity and instead moves towards a unity (Kendall, 2023). The identification as non-binary moves above the separation of male or female.
It is important to note that despite the influx of people identifying this way, it is not a uniquely modern concept. Examples of other cultures and periods’ use of this concept include the Hijras in India, the two-spirit people of Native American communities, Mino warrior women in Dahomey and Benin, the Mashoga of Kenya, the third gender of Hawaii and the Pacific Islands, the Sekrata of Madagascar, the Metis of Nepal, the Kathy of Thailand, the Waria of Indonesia, and the Xanith of Oman (Dozono, 2017). The fact that there were such separate conceptions of a similar concept by different groups of people across time indicates that to move past the binary is an expression of, in a unity of experience, finding similarity in a higher genus than simply the binary, aimed at such unity and structurally a priori to human experience.
There are clear benefits to this unifying move, and the main one is the lack of discrimination. People who identify as pansexual have a sort of openness to the possibility of connecting with others of varying gender identities. It is about loving someone for who they are regardless of these aspects of subjective identity. In the case of those who identify as non-binary, there comes a lack of discrimination based on male or female societal expectations. Even regarding job applications in academia, it has been shown that women are less likely to be hired or evaluated positively compared to male candidates with the same record (Steinpreis et al., 1999). So, it benefits women to have no gender indicators on their resumes. Not only this, but using they/them pronouns automatically is still inclusive of men, women, and non-binary individuals, and this makes gender less prominent in the every day, benefiting those otherwise marginalized by their gender being prominent (Saguy & Williams, 2019). Our natural inclination is to use these pronouns when gender is unknown anyway (Saguy & Williams). So, this unity of experience aimed at unity in gender expression helps to alleviate some discrimination in terms of gender.
This is where Kant’s commentary about the conflict between the aim of unity, interest in the domain, and the aim of manifoldness, interest in content, comes into important use. As previously mentioned, Kant believes that in aiming at the domain, “understanding thinks much under its concepts,” and in aiming at the content, “understanding thinks all the more in [its concepts]” (Critique of Pure Reason, A655/B683, p. 597). The former deals with the scope of a concept, while the latter involves all the further specifics within these conceptualizations. These aims are in opposite directions, one seeking to unify things and another differentiating them further. While some may seek recognition of their difference, others also seek to be viewed as unified with other humans. Sometimes, both are held within the same person. So, while there are clear benefits individually and socially regarding manifoldness and unity, they do not always work together.
For example, while the more prevalent use of “they/them” pronouns can work to benefit women, it simultaneously becomes misgendering for others, particularly affecting the transgender community (Hanna et al., 2019). These effects are not minor for this community either. “The act of misgendering denies the gendered and human legitimacy of trans people, and causes significant negative psychological effects, including reduced sense of self-worth, anxiety, depression and a feeling of hypervigilance and surveillance” (Hanna et al.). It doesn’t only affect their feelings but implicates their humanity. Despite a move towards unity, there is a lack of acknowledgment and affirmation of the manifoldness that some people have integral to their experience of the world, making it a non-equitable move. As inclusionary as the language of a universal “they/them” may seem, this universality becomes exclusionary of a community that already struggles to have their gender identities affirmed. This seems to leave us in a bind, asking ourselves what we do to promote societal equity when manifoldness and unity conflict.
5. Affinity in Gender Identity and Sexuality
As previously described, the regulative principle of affinity arises from the first two regulative principles (Critique of Pure Reason, A658/B686, p. 598). Without homogeneity, there is no scope, and without specificity, there is no content; there is nothing to be continuous, in affinity, without these two. Kant asserts that the regulative principle of affinity lacks determinate empirical use and that we are only generally inclined to seek it (A661/B689, p. 600). Regardless, it is an aim of our reason, and we are driven to find these unfixed continuities between each other. Finding some gradation of the manifoldness and unity in these areas, in true continuity, can be a regulative ideal for us to strive for, even if never fully empirically realized.
In order to truly investigate the world in terms of affinity regarding gender identity and sexuality, we must acknowledge both unity and manifoldness. To create continuity, we have to be able to acknowledge our universal similarities as well as our manifold of differences. Not only this, but there must be a realization that because of the manifoldness of experience and the limitations of our minds, there is an indeterminate number of differences, and we cannot speak to the degree of these differences (A656/B684, p. 597). Therefore, hasty judgments distancing people based on differences, often stereotypical or otherwise biased, become irrational. This would be an overstep to try to judge the degree of the difference. The aim of affinity is the most authentic place for inclusion, in an equitable sense, to occur. To try to include everyone from an “all people are just people” approach may seem to unify people, but to stop there does not account for all the differences that give rise to peoples’ experience of the world, especially the marginalized. We do not just look past our differences; we engage them openly while knowing our simultaneous unity.
Diversity, equity, and inclusion goals require us to recognize areas where we are unified and areas of differentiation, and we are rationally driven towards the truest inclusion through the regulative principle of affinity. Manifoldness and unity alone do not suffice. Certain people may need specific protections and acknowledgments to validate their experience in the world. For example, it may seem easy to say nobody should be discriminated against for any reason, but this can easily lead to immoral actions being condoned for being technically discriminated against. Discrimination means “prejudiced or prejudicial outlook, action, or treatment” (Discrimination Definition & Meaning). There is a caveat in overarching, universalized claims about discrimination. It makes sense that in an equitable society, while we should not treat people lesser than others as a form of retaliation for discrimination (as this would be discrimination in its definition), we should be able to make claims and seek restorative justice against those who oppress marginalized people without being considered discriminatory ourselves in terms of the law.
This is why lawmakers cannot make these overarching statements, even with the best intentions. A case that involves this is in Washington state’s anti-discrimination laws. In Bill 3026, updated as of 2010, Washington’s public school anti-discrimination laws include the following: “on the basis of race, creed, religion, color, national origin, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation including gender expression or identity, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability” (RCW 28A.642.010: Discrimination Prohibited-Definitions). Each of these categories simultaneously acknowledges a manifoldness while also trying to assert unity in a standard of treatment. An affinity is sought by finding common threads of unity and actively engaging in the fact that we have differences.
The continuity Kant speaks of can empirically be realized in the existing spectrums in these areas. Despite careful labeling in categorizing manifoldness, some people must still fall closer to one end or the other within the limits of a concept because of the law of specification (Critique of Pure Reason, A658/B686, p. 598). For example, someone could consider themselves to be gay while still having engaged with women prior to coming out. In contrast, others could consider themselves to be gay while never having engaged with women. This does not invalidate someone’s identification of their sexuality; it only goes to show that even within these subgroups, there is still some form of spectrum, even when broken into smaller parts. Affinity arises from acknowledging the manifoldness of experience while simultaneously acknowledging that we all remain on the spectrum together as a unity. Regardless of where someone falls, there is somewhere they’re accounted for on that spectrum.
The rainbow in the flag representing the LGBTQIA+ community can be used as an analogy for this spectrum and continuity accounting for both manifoldness and unity. When a rainbow is found after a rainy day, we can see distinctly different colors in that rainbow. We quickly identify red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet. These are distinctions in the diversity of color in the rainbow. We also still call the rainbow a rainbow, an overarching universalized term encompassing all these colors. The colors on a rainbow are not discreet, though. If you look more closely, they are a continuous, unbroken spectrum. In the same way Kant believes that there is an indeterminate number of differences between species, there is an indeterminate number of color differences to be found within that rainbow (A656/B684, p. 597). We struggle to look between the already labeled colors of the rainbow, and this is for the same reason that we struggle sometimes to seek affinity. Because the two regulative principles of unity and manifoldness are so quickly focused on and affinity so ambiguous, we are more drawn to see the distinct colors and the whole of the rainbow rather than the gradation in between, from one color to the next.
6. Kantian (and Other) Maxims to Achieve Affinity
While this paper primarily focused on Kant’s text Critique of Pure Reason, it would be remiss not to include a brief reference to Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the first section, Kant writes about his famous “categorical imperative.” He says, “I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 402, p. 14). To clarify this definition, a maxim is a subjective principle one takes up for action, making it explicitly not objective at this level (Critique of Pure Reason, A666/B694, p. 603). To determine if it has objective moral grounding beyond what is individual, the “categorical imperative” allows us to test its rational consistency and determine if it can be universalized outside of our personal motivations. Although it seems abstracted from human nature, it’s inherently connected to the autonomy and dignity of humans, limiting what will follow or break it. Kant believes humans have intrinsic worth from rationality and the consequent ability for morality and choice (Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 435, p.41). Their wills are fundamentally good, regardless of the consequences of their choices (Ak. 393, p. 7). This autonomy, or ability to act without external determination, is tied to our human dignity. Hence, any maxim denying the preservation of life or autonomy, affecting other wills in this way, fails the test of the categorical imperative (Ak. 440, p. 44-45). Furthermore, making these decisions requires knowledge of human nature. To properly apply the test, the manifoldness and diversity across experiences and historical and present oppression cannot be ignored because of how this informs universal application.
So, how can we use this concept to seek affinity and promote equity? In our interactions with others, we can adopt maxims that we would be willing to universalize due to their application to all people, a unity. There must be an approach with an underlying respect for dignity and autonomy. Maxims can simultaneously be taken on in a way in which we can gain an understanding of others’ manifoldness, finding common threads between our existences and experiences in the world. This provides more meaning, depth, and empathy beyond the “all people are just people” approach. We must assess our institutions and practices for oppressiveness to understand where there’s an obligation for correction. However, without an inclination towards affinity, we can’t gain genuine empathy for others so that moral laws can be written appropriately. The following principles are, at least in part, a foundation for affinity to be sought in terms of gender and sexuality. They have been selected on Kant’s basis of dignity and autonomy, and they seem to follow the categorical imperative even considering unknown, diverse experiences. Two of the five principles come from Kant himself, and the last three come from Father John Kavanaugh.
The first of Kant’s principles is to approach these interactions with good will (Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 394, p. 7). If we work to bring good will into how we communicate with others, there is more of a ground for a connection. This applies to both the Kantian and general senses of good will. Regarding Kant, both parties should approach the interaction freely and autonomously, and they shouldn’t be motivated by self-interest (Ak. 394, p. 7). In the general sense, it should be a cooperative, friendly interaction. Inevitably, even with good will in both senses, we are bound to make mistakes in handling diversity in ways we are less familiar with. We may accidentally put ourselves in a position where we may unwittingly and unintentionally offend another person. If both parties bring good will into the discussion, they are much more likely to reconcile this, move past it, and leave room for that connection rather than a wall going up. If both parties know that no ill will or malice was intended, the offended party is less likely to have the same intensity of hurt, and the offending party is more willing to correct the behavior.
The second Kantian principle is to treat people with a sense of humanity, treating them as ends in themselves and not just as a means to an end (Ak. 429, p. 36). Another way of stating this in everyday language is not only using people to get what we want. Because we can only know our phenomenal selves, not the noumenal self-in-itself or any deeper intentions we hold that we’re unaware of, we may accidentally use other people for our gain, reducing them to means. However, if someone becomes aware of previous discrimination in the interaction, this tasks them to change the course of their action. For example, suppose someone who desired to do well at their hiring position was solely hiring an individual to meet a diversity quota because it was the policy they inherited. In that case, they lack good will as they have ulterior, personal motives, and they use the person hired to achieve the goal of doing well at their job. They are essentially tokenizing the person that brings more diversity rather than focusing on the diversifying individual’s qualifications. This is not true inclusion. The person hiring is not showing any respect to the person they have hired with poor intent, as they intentionally use them for personal gain, aiming to merely meet the quota. If the hiring person became aware of their missteps, they would be tasked with finding ways to treat the diverse individuals as ends. This might mean changing the policy, engaging in more meaningful hiring processes, or other such shifts. The hiring person cannot help but still use the one hired as a means, as their position requires other people to be brought into the company. However, their focus should shift from that unwitting tokenization for personal job performance to the autonomous individuals they hire, respecting their humanity.
The remaining three principles of Kavanaugh’s are derived from his book Who Count as Persons?. He begins the book by writing that “an authentic ethical life requires the habits of interiority, intimacy, and openness” (Kavanaugh, 2001, p. 5). These principles overlap and intertwine with one another, and with the correct interpretation, they keep to Kant’s limitations in the categorical imperative of preserving dignity and autonomy. To hold a principle of interiority, one must be able to turn within oneself for self-reflection to understand why they do what they do, and through this turn inward, people can develop better intent and make more mindful choices. Without interiority, all the other principles become meaningless. We otherwise cannot try to investigate our true intentions with others. Even if we never fully know our subconscious intents, this reflection can help uncover some of the intents hidden from ourselves through this introspection. We end up unwittingly infringing on and denying the freedom and dignity of others without it. To hold a principle of intimacy, one must be willing to share themselves honestly and completely with the other. This includes the good, the bad, and the ugly. After turning inward, the individual becomes more aware of themselves and can share this more authentic self with the other. Openness, like intimacy, requires a willingness to share with the other completely. One must also be willing to take in the other’s existential truth in a way that allows oneself to be transformed or gain a deeper understanding of existence and the affinity between ourselves and others within the spectrum of existence despite it being hard to grasp concretely.
6. Concluding Remarks
While much of Kant’s work in the Critique of Pure Reason is subject to modern debate, his positing of the regulative principles—manifoldness, unity, and affinity—has shown itself to hold validity and warrant our attention. One can see manifoldness in the ever-diversifying LGBTQIA+ community, unity in both the “all people are just people” approach and the moves to more broadly scoped gender and sexuality labels, and affinity in this clear spectrum of human existence. The recognition of this point calls Kant’s other views on human sexuality into question. He expressed that:
Sexual union is the reciprocal use that one human makes of the sexual organs and capacities of another. This is either a natural use...or an unnatural use, and unnatural use takes place either with a person of the same sex or with an animal of a nonhuman species. Since such transgressions of principle...do wrong to humanity in our own person, there are no limitations or exceptions whatsoever that can save them from being repudiated completely (Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 277, p. 96).
Meanwhile, based on the regulative principles, it is entirely reasonable for humans to express themselves in this way. Perhaps Kant’s misstep was prescribing something without the proper knowledge of affinity between individuals different from himself. This may be why he took affinity’s connection within the spectrum of existence to lack determinate empirical use outside of guiding us toward unity (Critique of Pure Reason, A668/B696, p. 604). He could have been unknowing or less willing, hindering his finding this connection between different experiences on this front. Otherwise, he may have been guided towards a different conclusion. Kant was right to assert that unity is a goal of affinity, but he stopped short of a more socially inclusive unification. Kant, perhaps unknowingly, expressed that it is natural to the human experience to investigate and express these things based on the a priori structure of the mind through the regulative principles of homogeneity and specificity and that the most equitable social justice is found within affinity.
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